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APPL G PESTICIDES: TOW 
RECONCEPTUALIZING LIABILITY TO NEIGHBORS 
FOR CROP, LIVESTOCK PERSONAL 
D GES FROM AGRICULTU 
CHEMICAL DRIFT 
ROBERT F. BLOMQUIST* 
• 
I. Background 
The legacy of agricultural use of pesticide technologies in the United States is 
a mixed blessing.• On the one hand, "[t]here is no question that the productivity 
* Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. B.S., 1973, University of Pennsylvania 
(\Vharton School); J.D., 1977, Cornell Law School. My thanks go to my research assistant, Mark 
Thornburg, for his hard work and insightful advice. The research and writing of this Article was 
conducted pursuant to a research grant funded by Valparaiso University School of La\v. Another version 
of this Article was presented at the American Agricultural La\v Association's 16th Annual Educational 
Conference in Kansas City, Missouri in November 1995. Copyright© 1995, Robert F. Blomquist. 
1. See generally \VILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., 3 ENviRONMENTAL LAW: PESTICIDES AND TOXIC 
SUBSTANCES 322 (1988) [hereinafter PESTICIDES AND TOXIC SUBSTANCES]. For pertinent federal 
statutory definitions, see 7 U.S.C. § 136(u) (1995) (definition of .. pesticide"); § 136(f) (defining 
"defoliant"); § 136(t) (defining "pest"}. See also 40 C.P.R. § 152.3(5) (1995) (defining pesticides and 
classes of pesticides); § 152.15 (defining EPA Administrator•s regulatory definition of the tenn .. pest"). 
Professor Rodgers has described, in poignant prose worthy of full quotation, the ethical dimensions of 
pervasive societal use of pesticides: 
\Vhile pollution is chiefly a subject of the unintended consequences of technological 
undertakings, pesticides are unequivocally designed to disrupt, defeat, or destroy nature's 
choice. That the essence of the exercise is to pollute purposefully is underscored by 
historical pesticide practices that celebrated the dissemination of crude and notorious 
poisons. Of course, the destroy-by-design feature of pesticides practices does not foreclose 
the behavior as a matter of social choice; in legal parlance, the decision to apply 
pesticides could be considered excused or justified by overriding social considerations. 
But characterizing applications of pesticides as instances of excused pollution underscores 
the stark zero-sum features of the behavior where gains are secured only at the expense 
of environmental incursions explicitly approved. The popular nonzero-sum perception of 
pollution cleanup (the company can continue to operate while the rest of us enjoy clean 
water) does not hold for acts of excused pollution. 
That the pesticide laws endorse direct attacks on living things that are customarily the 
beneficiaries of the environmental laws is underscored by the prominent definitions. A 
"pesticide" [by federal statutory definition] is a substance used to cause the death or 
control the growth of nonhuman animals or plants. The generic term "pesticide" typically 
is subdivided further by reference to classes of intended targets or methods of operation -
amphibian and reptile poisons, antimicrobial agents, attractants (designed to draw animals 
into traps), bird poisons, defoliants, desiccants (plant drying agents), fish poisons, 
fungicides, herbicides, insecticides, invertebrate animal poisons, mammal poisons and 
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of American agriculture is due in large part to the success of modern pesticides. 112 
Indeed, between 1950 and 1987 total output of crops and livestock nearly doubled -
increasing by eighty percent.3 The cornucopia of goods produced by American 
farmers has, in turn, helped to feed the world.4 On the other hand, extensive use 
of pesticides has crf~ated what William H. Rodgers, Jr. has labeled .. pervasive 
spillovers .. s a classic tragedy of the commons dilemma6 involving a .. perva-
sive impact on nontarget organisms and the environment," coupled with a 
qualitative and quantit~tive evolutionary resistance, over time, by target organisms 
to agricultural chemicals.' 
repellents, nematicides (hookwonns), plant regulators, rodenticides, and slimicides. 
A "pest" covers virtually any form of plant or animnllife declared by the Administrator 
of the EPA to be "injurious to health or the environment." In an ironic and striking 
turnaround, the Administrator has chosen not to compile a list of known pests, but to 
declare virtually every living thing a pest when it exists under circumstances "that make 
it deleterious to mnn or the environment." Qualifying target organisms thus include dogs, 
cats, songbirds, elephants, skunks, rabbits, earthworms, and anything else nominnted ns 
a "pest" by human constituency. Since a substance aimed at virtuaJiy any living target 
satisfies the .. pestidde" requirement, the inquhy and the registration process is confined 
to the questions of whether the product works and estimates of the toll that will be tnken 
• on nontarget orgnrusms. 
Understandably, an Act of Congress that pits humans against all other species ("the 
pests") is taking sides on issues of environmental ethics that long have been debated. [The 
prevailing] school of thought ... perceives nature as something to be attacked, dominnted, 
controlled, and re(;uced to the service of humans. This view finds comfort, for exnmple, 
in the destruction by rhotanone of millions of '1unk" fish in Jakes to make room for 
preferred species. This is the view endorsed by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and 
Rodenticide Act, that perceives nature ns the enemy. 
WILUAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 394-96 (2d ed. 1994) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter 
ENVIRONMENTAL LA\\']; see also CHRISTOPHER J. BOSSO, PESTICIDES AND POLITICS xii (1987) (stating 
that pesticide regulation differs from other environmental regulation since chemical pesticides nrc created 
intentionally). · , - . 
2. JOHN M. JOHNSON & GEORGE W. WARE, PESTICIDE LmGATION MANUAL 1·1 (1993) (endnote 
omitted) [hereinafter PESTICIDE MANUAL]. See infra notes 6-7 and accompanying text (describing 
"pervasive spilloverstl of pesticide use and questionable production gains per input of ngriculturnl 
chemicals). 
3. BARRY COMMONER, MAKING PEACE WI1H TilE PLANET 85 ( 1990). 
4. See, e.g., 1995 BRITANNICA BOOK OF TIJE YEAR 90-100 (Charles P. Trumbull ed., 1995) 
(providing agricultural statistics illustrating American preeminence in the production and trade of 
agricultuml commodities). 
5. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note I, at 397. 
6. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of tlze Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244-45 ( 1968) (reprinted 
in ROGER W. FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 29-30 (4th ed. 1995) ("Each man 
is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit in a world that is limited."). 
7. ENVIRONMENTAL LAw, supra note 1, at 397. As explained by Rodgers: 
[T]he normal pattern of pesticide use on the fann is a broadscale application where a tiny 
fraction (perhaps l percent?) reaches the target species to work its intended effect. This 
practice has a vast spillover aptitude strongly suggesting chemical pesticide success stories 
are necessarily the harbingers of unwanted side effects. Indeed, the dissemination in the 
environment of p<!Sticide residues has been described ns the world's foremost pollution 
problem. The reasons are many and complex but the predominant fact is that large 
quantities of cheJnical compounds that are toxic, mobile, and persistent are released 
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.. 
On a more prosaic, but equally vital level, spillovers from agricultural pesticide 
use have spurred a kaleidoscopic variety8 of common law actions against 
pesticide manufacturers, applicators and farmers for personal and property 
damages. Three categories of pesticide liability conflicts are reflected in the case 
deliberately into the environment each year. By 1970 in the United States alone more than 
a billion pounds (5 pounds per person) of some 900 registered pesticides (more than 50 
percent for farm use) per year were entering the environment through various media. 
These pesticides were aimed primarily at about 2000 pest species of plants and animals 
but many of the other 200,000 species present "were either directly or indirectly affected 
by these widespread pesticide applications." 
... Although pesticides for farm use were first manufactured in 1902, we do know that 
the industry did not experience explosive growth until the close of hostilities in World 
\Var II when it put to use knowledge acquired from wartime research on DDT and other 
compounds. The growth curve was dramatic in the early days: The dollar value of the 
products produced in the U.S. rose from $440 million in 1964 to $12 billion in 1969. By 
1976, U.S. fanners v1ere using pesticides on 70 percent of the acreage planted, up from 
50 percent only five years earlier. Usage increased fivefold between 1950 and 1978. The 
estimates of production by U.S. chemical companies show an erratically rising curve that 
is now at 1.5 billion pounds per year. 
/d. at 397-99 (footnotes omitted). 
Rachel Carson, of course, was an early advocate of prudent pesticide use and one of the intellectual 
pioneers in the history of federal environmental laws. See generally Robert F. Blomquist "Clean, New 
~Vorld": Toward an Intellectual History of American Environmental lAw, 1961-90, 25 VAL. U. L. REV. 
I (1990), reprinted in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: THE INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF EsSAYS IN LAW AND 
. . 
LEGAL THEORY 31-79 (Michael C. Blumm ed. 1993). In recent years, Barry Commoner has assumed 
the role of vocal critic of pesticide application practices and presuppositions. In a recent book, 
Commoner provides an illuminating second look at the widely-heralded statistics of increased American 
agricultural productivity and the common assumption that pesticides have been a panacea for this 
increased production. Commoner observes that while "U.S. output of crops and livestock" between 1950 
and 1987 increased a total of 80 percent: 
A major influence has been exerted by very specific changes in the technology of 
production. The use of mechanical equipment remained constant, labor input decreased 
by 71 percent, the use of seeds and feed increased by 86 percent and the use of 
agricultural chemicals (insecticides, herbicides, and fungicides) increased by 484 percent. 
Thus, the major change in the technology of agricultural production has been the use of 
less labor and much more agricultural chemicaJs. The efficiency with which the various 
inputs generate the fann output is a major detern1inant of the fanns' net returns. This is 
expressed as productivity that is, the ratio of output to input. Computed in this way, 
between 1950 and I 970 the productivity of labor increased by 513 percent, the 
productivity of machinery increased by 80 percent, the productivity of seeds and feed 
decreased by 3 percent and the productivity of agricultural chemicals decreased by 69 
percent. 
COMMONER, supra note 3, at 85-86 (original emphasis). For detailed statistics, see generally PESTICIDE 
MANUAL, supra note 2, at 1-2 to 1-4. For a short history of pesticide regulation, see generally id. at 1-4 
to 1-15 (describing, among other things, how an 1863 British statute to protect the public from 
potentially harmful contact with chemicals An Act For the More Effectual Condensation of Muriatic 
Acid in Alkali Works was the first Anglo-American legislative effort to protect the public from 
potentially harmful contact with chemicals). 
8. PESTICIDES AND TOXIC SUBSTANCES, supra note 1, at 325. Compare the fascinating variety of 
criminal cases involving pesticides collected, id. at 323 n.l4 (deliberate assaults with pesticides on 
others); id. at n.IS (surreptitious poisonings subject to homicide charges). 
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law: (1) personal injury product liability cases against the pesticide manufacturer 
or seller; (2) crop da1nage product liability cases against the pesticide manufactur-
er or seller; and (3) .. classical drift damage cases where third-party strangers to 
the transaction sufft:r losses (usually to crops or livestock)" from exposure to 
pesticides.9 The third category of disputes is, perhaps., the most dramatic societal 
lesson of the .. vast capacity for spillover damage.. caused by agricultural 
chemicals.10 Pesticide drift is a clearcut example of an environmental externality 
b·ecause it can potentially cause a wide assortment of property damage to crops 
and livestock of neighboring landowners and occupiers while posing risks of 
·9. /d. at 335. 
10. /d. at 328. The .. problem of drift from pesticide application" is aptly described in the PESTICIDE 
MANUAL, supra note 2, at 19-1 to 19-2. According to the authors: 
A large percentage of pesticide litigations involve off-target drift of pesticides at the time 
of application. Lawsuits have resulted from the drift of herbicides onto sensitive crops 
where crop yields ·;vere ·seriously reduced or plants killed outright. Humans and domestic 
animals have bee,1 made ill directly by drift and -indirectly by eating food or feed 
contaminated by pesticide residues. Crops may become unsalable because of this 
contamination, which may result in changes in appearance, size or quality,-or in residues_ 
that exceed tolerance. Beneficial insects, particularly honeybees; may be_ destroyed and 
soil may become ,;ontaminated, causing damage to crops that follow.. Fish and wildlife 
may be killed or reproduction reduced by pesticide drift onto standing or runnlng waters 
and onto natural vegetation. Last, there may be annoying effects of drift in the form of 
aerosol-:size particles that result in human reactions such as allergies, bronchial irritations 
and psychosontatic or imaginary illnesses. (Unpleasant odors make some people ill, 
identified as chemophobia.) 
Pesticide drift n1ay be toxic to plants, domestic and: wild animals,_ beneficial pollinators, 
and man. Some pesticides exert their effect slowly while others act quickly. Some are 
broken down readily in the environment while others tend to remain for long periods. 
Responsibility and safety are oveniding considerations in pesticide application. because 
pesticide drift ll)sses from the target area may affect the ·environment, persons living 
and working in that environment, dov;nwind crops and bodies of water, and the applicator 
himself. 
Pesticide appli~.ations from aircraft and ground equipment drift off-target. Drift occurs 
during every application, some more than others. For example, when a dust formulation 
is applied, the du~t cloud is easily followed v1ith the eye as it moves along slowly over 
the intended target, v;ith some of the dust eventually moving off-targ~t in the prevailing 
air column. In this instance drift is evident because it is highly visible. Basically the same 
thing happens with sprays, but the drift is essentially invisible and does not attract 
• • 
attention. 
• • • • 
What is drift? When pesticide sprays are applied to crops by aircraft or ground 
equipment, a portion of the spray is generated in the form of very small droplets, so small 
that they do not immediately impinge on the crop or fall to the ground, but rather they 
remain suspended for varying lengths of time. As these small droplets remain -suspended, 
they become smaller due to evaporation of the water in them, causing them to remain 
suspended even lc~nger. During this time the air movement, though almost imperceptible, 
gradually carries these suspended particles downwind and off-target. 
The term drift or drift-loss as it applies to pesticide application is defined as the 
movement of airborne liquid or solid material from the target area at the time of 
application. 
Id. (footnote omitted) . 
• 
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various personal injuries and diseases to human beings.11 Thus, common law tort 
theories imposing liability for crop, livestock and personal damages on those 
responsible for creating the pesticide drift (hereinafter referred to as nPesticide 
Driftmakers .. ) should be understood as social efforts to internalize those external 
costs by making the polluter pay.12 
In the remaining parts of this article, I provide further ruminations on 
theoretical legal responsibilities of Pesticide Driftmakers. In Part ll of the article, 
I address empirical judicial liability calls regarding Pesticide Driftmakers under 
what I refer to as the preexisting liability paradigm; this paradigm invokes 
familiar tort theories of strict liability and negligence, peppered with occasional 
references_ to nuisance and trespass. In Part m of the article, I sketch some 
thoughts on reconceptualizing liability for pesticide drift. I tentatively explore the 
possibility of combining the preexisting liability paradigm of the common law as 
a fallback level of Pesticide Driftmaker responsibility with a ne\v incentive-bas_ed 
paradigm, initiated by state legislation, that would combine insurance provisions 
with liability immunity opportunities based on principles of agricultural pollution 
prevention and best agricultural practices. 
II. The Preexisting Liability Paradigm for Pesticide Driftmakers 
A. Early Cases Before 1970 
A hodgepodge of early cases addressed questions of liability for property or 
personal injuries caused by agricultural pesticide drift from spraying or dusting 
crops. 13 In fortnulating and applying various liability theories to hold Pesticide 
Driftmakers, cropdusters and the persons hiring them, legally accountable, the 
courts were not always lucid in their analyses. One court expressed the vie\v that 
11 [i]n some cases, it is difficult to detect what theory the [courts were] follow-
ing."r4 
1. Landowner/Hirer Liability 
The consensus of courts addressing the issue have found the hirer (usually a 
farmer) vicariously liable for the sprayer's negligence. The rationale for the 
decisions in these cases is that cropdusting is an inherently dangerous or intrinsi-
11. See generally ROGER \V~ FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 32-34 (4th ed. 
1995) (discussing the concept of external costs). 
12. See generally id. at 238-42 (discussing liability regimes as devices to internalize external costs). 
13. For early law revie\v analyses of the problems of pesticide drift, see, e.g., Note, Crop Dusting: 
Legal Problems in a New Industry, 6 STAN. L. REV- 69 (1953); Note; Liability for Chemical Damage 
From Aerial Crop Dusting, 43 MINN. L,.; REV. 531 (1959); Comment, Crop Dusting Scope of Liability 
and a Need for Reform in Texas lAw, 40 TEx. L. REV •. 527 (1962); Note, Regulation and Liability in 
the Application of Pesticides; 49 IO\VA L. REV. 135 (1963). 
14. Loe v. Lenhardt, 362 P.2d 312, 314 (Or. 1961). 
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cally dangerous activity" 15 This characteristic creates an exception to the general 
rule of nonliability of a hirer for the torts of an independent contractor. 
A representative case in this line of precedent is the 1953 opinion by the 
Supreme Court of New Mexico in Pendergrass v. Lovelace. 16 The court held that 
' 
a landowner was not immune from tort liability for negligence just because the 
pesticide spraying was conducted by an independent contractor because the work 
involved (spraying th~~ 2,4-D to cropland) was intrinsically and inherently danger-
ous. Accordingly, the defendant landowner was deemed to have assumed full 
responsibility for the acts-of the pilot. It was of no consequence, in the court's 
view, whether or nc.t the landowner had exercised due care in selecting the 
contractor since the legal concept involved was vicarious liability a variation 
of strict liability for the negligence of others simply because of the status of the 
defendant and the type of activity eng_aged in by the crop duster. 11 
A landowner-hirer, in addition to being vicariously liable for the negligence of 
cropdusters because of the perceived inherent or intrinsic_ danger of crop dusting, 
has in pre-1970 cas•~s been held directly liable for pesticide drift based on a 
theory of strict liability for ''ultrahazardous" activities.18 
15. See Sanders v. Bc~kwith, 283 P.2d 235, 238 (Ariz. 1955); Lundberg v. Bolon, 194 P.2d 454, 
458 (Ariz. 1948); S.A. Gerrard Co. v. Fricker, 27 P.2d 678. 680 (Ariz. 1933); Heeb v. Prysock, 245 
S.W.2d 577,_ 579 (Ark. 1952); McKennon v. Jones, 244 S.W.2d 138, 140 (Ark. 1951); Parks v .. Atwo-od 
Crop Dusters, 257 P.2d 653~ 655 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953); Pannella v. Reilly, 23 N.B.2d 87, 88 (Mass. 
1939); Lawler v. Skelton, 130 So. 2d 565,569 (Miss .. 1961); Pendergrass v. Lovelace, 262 P.2d 231,232 
(N.M. 1953); Burke v. Thomas, 313 P .. 2d 1082, 1088 (Okla. 1957), But see Pitchfork l.and & Cattle Co. 
v. Kingl! 346 S.W.2d 598, 603 .. 04 (Tex. 1961) (holding ranch owner who hired a spmying contractor to 
. . . 
perfonn herbicide spray is not liable for cropduster's negligence since the cropduster furnished all 
necessacy tools, supplies, .3Ild materials to perform the job); cf. Leonard v. Abbot, 357 S.W.2d 778,781 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1962) (recognizing that a landowner may be liable for the duster•s negligence even if the 
duster is an independent contractor); Aerial Sprayers v. Yerger, Hill & Son, 306 S.W.2d 433,437 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 1957) (holding recognized landowner to be liable for cropdustefs negligence). 
16. 262 P.2d 231 (N.M. 1953). 
17. I d. One commentator has discussed the potential difficulties with this line of reasoning in the 
following terms: 
The most obvious _question that arises under this statement of the law is: What is an 
inherently dangerous actiVity? The courts are_:generally agreed that the application of 2-4-D 
is an inherently dangerous activity, and the same reasoning_ has been -applied to other 
pesticides. The finding of an inherently dangerous activity is difficult, however; the ·crux 
of the finding lies not in the activity per se, but rather, in the foreseeable hannful results 
that inevitably follow from a miscarriage in the conduct of the activity~ It will also tum 
on the extent nnd type of harm to be expected. For example, it is inevitable that 2-4-D 
drifting onto a broad-leaved crop will cause extensive damage to that crop, no matter whnt 
precautions are taken. Thus, the finding of inherent danger in the activity turns on the 
substance applied. While a court may readily find aerial application of pesticides 
inherently dange1-ous, it does not necessarily follow that aerial application of other 
substances, such CtS seeds, will be found inherently dangerous, although it may in fact give 
rise to substantial damage. 
Craig A. Kennedy, Liatility in the Aerial Application of Pesticides, 22 S.D. L. Rev. 75, 80 (1977) 
(footnotes omitted). 
18. See, e.g.~ Gotre.1ux v. Gary. 94 So. 2d 293 (La 1957); Jones v. Morgan, 96 So. 2d 109 (Ln. 
1957); Loe v .. Lenhardt, 362 P~2d 312 (Or. 1961) ... In jurisdictions imposing strict liability for property 
1995] DAMAGES FROM CHEMICAL DRIFT 399 
2. Sprayer Liability 
Early court opinions have also resolved disputes involving the liability of a 
pesticide sprayer for neighbors• crop, livestock or personal injuries. A panoply of 
legal theories of tort liability ranging from trespass to nuisance, negligence and 
strict liability have been discussed by the judiciary. Many times, however, the 
courts' use of tort concepts in these opinions has been confusing and convoluted, 
at best 
First, pre-1970 court opinions in a handful of cases have re_cognized, or at least 
suggested the potential validity of, claims by neighbors against pesticide sprayers 
predicated on variations of the intentional tort of trespass.19 For example, in 
Schronk v. Gilliam,20 the Texas Court of Civil Appeals analyzed the fact pattern 
as a trespass action, noting that all parties conceded on argument that plaintiffs 
crop damage \Vas caused when the defendant-landowner's aircraft sprayed 
pesticides, \Vhich drifted off-site onto plaintiffs lands. In somewhat jumbled 
prose, the Schronk court held that the crop spraying undertaken by the defendant 
was not privileged, was not undertaken in a reasonable manner, and unreasonably 
interfered with the plaintiff-neighbor's enjoyment of the surface of his property.21 
The court concluded that whether the situation was viewed as a wrongful act after 
rightful entry, or alternatively, as a trespass ab initio, was unimportant.22 
Observing that the entry of the aircraft's fuselage,_ even at a privileged altitude, 
was acc9mpanied by active and continuous spraying of the agricultural chemicals -
"which constituted as much a part of the flight as if defendant's aircraft bad been 
dragging a great scythe across the land below itu · the court held that actionable 
trespass had been established and no allegation of negligence was required.23 
damage from the drifting of pesticides, '[t]he question in general is not whether defendant acted with due 
care and caution, but ·whether his acts-occasioned the damage' ... Tybe A. Brett & Jane B.R. Potter, Risks 
to Human Health Associated with Exposure to Pesticides at the Time of Application and the Role of the 
Courts, I VILL. L. REV. 355, 392 (1990) (quoting Young v. Darter, 363 P.2d 829, 833 (Okla. 1961)) 
(citing .Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330)) (footnote omitted). "Thus, while the plaintiff need 
not prove fault, causation must still be shown. Proof of causation, however, seems to justify the 
imposition of liability, ajudgment that implies that the defendant has invaded an interest of the plaintiffs 
worthy of protection... Brett & Potter, supra, at 392. 
19. Compare, hov1ever, that the insistence that a trespass involve an invasion by an "object" or a 
"thing" was: rejected by the court in Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790 (Or. 1959) (holding 
that gaseous and particulate fluorides from an aluminum smelter constituted a trespass for purposes of 
the statute of limitations); Bradley v. American Smelting & Refining Co~, 709 P.2d 782 (Wash. 1985) 
(adopting elements ofa trespass by airborne pollutants consistent with Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 
So. 2d 523, 529 (Ala. 1979) requiring, runong other things,: substantial damages to the RES); see,_ e.g., 
Aim v. Johnson,275 P.2d 959 (Idaho 1954); Wall v. Trogdon, 107 S.E.2d 757 (N.C. 1959); Schronk v. 
Gilliam, 380 S.\V.2d 743 (Tex. Ct. App. 1964). 
20. 380 S.\V.2d 743 (Tex. Ct. App. 1964). 
21. Id. at 744"45. 
22. /d. at 746. 
23. ld. at 745. According to one commentator, "[t]he cases applying trespnss to aerial applicators 
illuminate two different theories of trespass" one is "negligent trespass"; the other is "unintentional 
trespass." Kennedy, supra note 17, at 84-86. These unusual trespass cases, however, are "similar in 
appearance" to early cases which imposed liability upon applicators on a theory of nuisance. ld. at 83-84; 
400 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:393 
Second, courts in numerous early opinions have recognized that someone who 
applies-chemical dusts or sprays to crops may be liable for damages caused to 
another, based on assorted views of negligence,24 For instanc,e, in the 1952 case, 
Faire v. Burke,25 the Supreme Court of Missouri noted that while it was clear 
that farmers have the right to use various beneficial new chemical sprays and 
dusts to maximize their crop production, a standard of due care informs a 
sprayer's responsibility in applying the pesticides. Therefore, a sprayer has the 
duty to check the weather and to ascertain that weather conditions are not likely 
to spread pesticides onto adjoining landowners' property.26 
By way of another example, the New Jersey court in Smith v. Okerson21 
discussed principles of negligence law in the course of analyzing an action 
brought by a dairy farmer against a potato grower/sprayer for pesticide drift 
harmful to the plaintiff's dairy herd.28 Articulating standard negligence con-
cepts,l9 the court noted that a variety of factors would inform the decision of 
whether or not the sprayer had used reasonable care in applying pesticides: (1) 
cf. Gainey v. Folkman, 114 F. Supp. 231 (D. Ariz. 1953); Miles v. A. Arena & Co., 73 P.2d 1260 (Cal. 
1937). 
24. See, e.g., Aerial A,gric. Serv. v. Richard, 264 F.2d 341 (Sth Cir. 1959) (applying Mississippi 
law); 'Valton v.; Sherwin ... "\Villiams Co., 191 F.2d 277 (8th Cir. 1951) (applying Arkans~ taw and 
recognizing rule); Motors Ins. Corp. v. Aviation Specialties, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 973 (W.D. Mich. 1969); 
Sanders v. Beckwith~ 283 P.2d 235 (Ariz. 1955); Lundberg v. Bolon, 194 P.2d 454 (Ariz. 1948); \V.B .. 
Bynum Cooperage Co. v. Cou)J~r, 244 S.W.2d 955 (Ark. 1952); McKennon v. Jones, 244 S~\V.2d 138 
(Ark. 1951); Kennedy v. Clayton, 227 S.\V.2d 934 (Ark. 1950); Chapman Chern. Co. v. Taylor, 222 
S.W.2d 820 (Ark. 1949); llammond Ranch Corp. v. Dodson. 136 S.\V.2d 484 (Ark. 1940); Andreen v. 
Escondido Citrus Union; 2.69 P~ 556 (Cal. 1928); Kolberg v. Sherwin~Williams Co., 269 P. 975 (Cal. 
1928); Yasukochi, Inc. v .. McKibbin, 312 P.2d 770 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957); Adams v .. Henning, 255 P.2d 
456 (Cat Ct. App. 1953); Parks v. Atwood Crop Dusters, 257 P.2d 653 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953); Lenk v. 
Spezia, 213 P.2d 47 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949); Miles v. A. Arena & Co., 73 P.2d 1260 (Cal. Ct. App. 1937); 
Nizzi v. Laverty Sprayers, Inc., 143, N.,\V.2d '312 (Iowa 1966); Kentucky Aerospray, Inc. v. Mays, 251 
S.W.2d 460 (Ky. 1952); Dupre v. Roane Flying Serv., Inc., 196-So. 2d 835 (La. Ct. App. 1967); Lawler 
v. Skelton, 130 So. 2d 565 (Miss. 1961); Faire v. Burke, 252 S.W.2d 289 (Mo. 1952); Rose v. Buffalo 
Air Serv., 104 N.W.2d 431 (Neb. 1960); Smith v. Okerson, 73 A.2d 857 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1950); 
Christensen v. Midstate Aerial Applications Corp., 166 N.W.2d 386 (N.D. 1969); Olmstead v~ Reedy, 
387 P~2d 631 (Okla. 1963); Hiller v. Rist, 362 P.2d 678 (Okla. 1961); Wieting v. Ball Air Spray. Inc., 
173 N.W.2d 272 (S.D. 1969); Pitchfork Land & Cattle Co. v. King, 346 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. 1961): 
Gamblin v .. Ingram, 378 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Ct. App. 1964); Bruenger v. Burkett, 364 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 1963); Aerial Sprayers v. Yerger, Hill & Sun, 306 S.W .2d 433 (Tex. Ct. App. 1957); Schultz 
v. Harless, 271 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Ct. App~ 1954); Miller V;; Maples, 278 S.\V.2d 385 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1954). 
25. 252 S.W .2d 289 (Mo. 1952). 
26. /d. 
27. 73 A.2d 857 (N.J. Super. a. Ch. Div. 1950). 
28. In somewhat unusual facts, the plaintiff .. dairy farmer contended that defendant .. potato grower 
had caused pesticide drift from a spraying apparatus to drift onto plaintiffs dairy farm; plaintiff proved 
that in order to save: his herd he had to move his cattle rather than allowing them to remain in pasture 
and to eat the contaminated fodder. Ultimately, the plaintiff recovered for the value of the abandoned 
fodder. Id: at 859. 
29. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§§ 291-293 (1965) (discussing .. unreasonable-
ness, •• ''magnitude of risk,.. and "utility of conduct"). 
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the likelihood that the act will caus,e injury to another; (2) the likelihood tllat the 
injury will be serious; (3) the utility of the act itself; and ( 4) the feasibility of a 
substitution such that the same benefits could be achieved with less hazard to 
others.30 Moreover, a number of courts have held that in determining whether a 
pesticide sprayer is negligent, the previous experience and knowledge of the 
sprayer are critical in adjudicating whether the sprayer was on notice or should 
have been a\vare of unreasonable dangers created by the pesticide application.31 
The most common relevant facts in early negligence cases are: (1) use of an 
improper chemical conc_entration; (2) incorrect equipment calibration; (3) 
application of the chemical under improper weather conditions; (4) failure to 
utilize proper equipment; and (5) application in an improper place.32 
30. See Stnith, 13 A.2d 857 (N.J. Super. 0. Ch~ Div. 1950). • 
31. See, e.g., Chapman Chern. Co. v. Taylor, 222 S.W.2d ·szo, 825 (Ark. 1949) (affirming 
defendant's verdict for nonliability since defendant 'had no· previous experience in the use of agricultural 
chemicals which could have· given defendant an indication of the danger of using 2, 4-D to a crop almost 
a mile away from the target site); Bums v. Vaughan, 224S.W.2d 365,366 (Ark. 1949) (affinning award 
of damages for negligent pesticide application, and noting that the defendant knew that another farmer 
living a few miles away from the defendant had released the same pesticide by airplane tv1o weeks before 
defendant's spraying and that this previous incident had resulted in damages); Cole v. New England Tree 
Expert Co., 163 A. 742, 743 (R.I. 1933) (affinning award of compensatory damages to plaintiff 
landowner for the death of a covt resulting from spraying by a tree service, and noting that one of the 
sprayer's employees admitted that he had been warned to be careful in applying the pesticide spray 
because of the close proximity of plaintiffs dairy farm and, yet, the employee gave no notice to the 
plaintiff or other nearby landowners of the impending spraying); McPherson v. Billington, 399 S. \V .2d 
186, 190 (Tex. Ct. App. 1965) (affirming award of damages in ravor of pig farmer; the defendant 
cropduster testified that at the time he was spraying an adjoining cotton field v1ith pesticides he knew 
that plaintiffs sv1ine pens were close to the spraying area while also being aware that the arsenic acid 
spray was a dangerous poison to animal life and the pesticide containers provided such a warning). 
Compare early cases that rejected pesticide sprayer liability when the plaintiff was deemed to_ be 
contributorily negligent. In Lenk v. Spezia, 213 P.2d 47, 49 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949), for example, the 
intennediate appellate court affinned a judgment for the defendant tomato sprayer in an action brought 
by a farmer for death of his bees due to cropdusting. The court concluded, inter alia, that the record 
belov1 indicated that the bee farmer knew of the impending nearby cropdusting but failed to exercise 
ordinary care in removing or adequately screening his bees. /d., at 53. 
Compare pre-1970 cases that have adjudicated the effect of the plaintiffs failure to give a statutorily-
mandated notice of damages stemming from pesticide application as a ·precondition to ·suit. In general, 
the early cases have interpreted and applied these statutory provisions in favor of the plaintiff. See, e.g., 
Olmstead v. Reedy, 387 P.2d 631,633 (Okla. 1963) (holding, in response to defendant's contention that 
the plaintiff had given insufficient written notic;,e under an Oklahoma 60-day notice statute, that the 
statute v/as substantially complied with when the plaintiff provided written notice of pesticide damage 
to his growing crops pecan trees, shade trees and ornamental shrubs but had not mentioned damage 
to his truck patch or alfalfa since the statute was not intended as an evidentiary bar, but merely as a 
provision to allow defendants the opportunity to investigate the circumstances of purported pesticide 
damages while the evidence was fresh); Cross v. Harris, 370 P.2d 703, 706 (Or., 1962) (rejecting 
cropduster's argument that notice statute should bar recovery of pesticide damage to plaintiffs barley crop 
because statutory objection was waived by the defendant's failure to file a demurrer); Loe v. Lenhardt, 
362 P.2d 312, 319 (Or. 1961) (rejecting an argument by the defendant crop sprayer that plaintiff v1as 
barred from recovering crop damage for failure to file a report ofloss prior to commencing suit because 
plaintiffs cause of action was based on a common la\v right v1hicb required the notice statute to be 
carefully construed and because plaintiff substantially complied with the statute). 
32. Cropduster's Failure to Exercise Care in Spraying Crops, 9 PROOF OF FACTS 623, 628-29 
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Third, a few pre-1970 court opinions applied the theory of strict liability in tort 
to hold pesticide sprayers liable for drift-related damages. For instance, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court in the 1961 opinion of Young v. Darte~3 held the 
evidence to be sufficient to sustain judgment in favor of a neighboring cotton 
farmer for damage ttJ his cotton crop based on a strict liability th-eory against the 
defendant-faoner/sprayer. The defendant sprayed 2,4-D and water, but contended 
that he lacked knowledge of the pesticide's hazardous qualities and its propensity 
to drift. The court, however, was not impressed by the defendant's purported lack 
of knowledge. The Young court applied strict liability principles and held that the 
law required the sprayer/farmer to not infringe upon the rights of adjoining 
fanners to be free of harmful pesticide drift when exercising his own right to use 
pesticides to enhance_ his crop.34 
B. Later Cases 1970 to Present 
The kaleidoscopic and ad hoc nature ofjudicial opinions issued in response to 
lawsuits 'brought by plaintiffs against Pesticide Driftmakers for property and 
personal damages has continued unabated from 1970 to the present. Little 
doctrinal change has occurred in the case law during the last twenty-five years. 
Nevertheless, a few interesting Judicial trends and developments are noteworthy. 
1. Continued Judicial Reluctance to Use Intentional Tort Theories 
Courts continue to be reluctant to impose classical intentional tort theories to 
pesticide drift cases. While one might suspect, on a theoretical level, that "classi-
cal trespass law would be strongly accounted for ... [since] the instrument of 
damage, after all, is an unwelcome and direct invasion by toxic aerosols, .. '' 
recent case law yields few reported examples of this sort.36 One commentator 
has speculated that the explanation for this trend is that judicial .. analysis usually 
flows in other doctrinal channels, primarily because the wrong is perceived as 
(1977). Judicial views of the nature of aerial application of pesticides as "inherently or/ extremely 
dangerous," see supra notes lS to 18 and accompanying text, have tended to "hold aerial applicators nnd 
the fanners for whom thay work to a very high standard of care because of the recognized danger of the 
operation." Richard D. Chappuis, Jr., The Flight ,of Toxic Tort Aerial Application of Insecticides and 
Herbicides: From D1·ijt Liability to Toxic Tort, 58 J. AIR L. & CoM. 411, 420 (1992) (footnotes omitted). 
33. 363 P.2d' 829 (()kla. 1961). 
34.. ld. at 833. Arguments in favor of imposing strict liability for pesticide drift are set forth in pre-
1970 legal literature. See, e.g., Note, Regulation and Liability in the Application of Pesticides, 49 IOWA 
L. REV. 135 (1963); No~.e, Liabilityfor Chemical Damage from Aerial Crop Dusting. 43 MINN. L. REV. 
531 (1959); Note. Crop Dusting: Legal Problems in a New Industry, 6 STAN. L. REV. 69 (1953). 
35. PEsTICIDES AND TOXIC SUBSTANCES, supra note l, at 336 (footnote omitted). 
36. See, e.g., TexaE. v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236,239 (lOth Cir. 1971) (holding that release of pesticide 
residues in one state that ·pollutes an interstate stream serving as a source of municipal water in another 
state constitutes a violation of the federal common law of nuisance); Hall v. Pioneer Crop Care, Inc., 512 
P.2d 491 (Kan. 1973); Hall v. Phillips, 436 N.\V.2d 139, 141-46 (Neb. 1989) (raising ,a question of 
,· 
possible intentional nubance resulting from wind blown soil containing herbicide). 
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being an isolated tortious event rather than the misfiring of a continuous 
relationship bet\veen the parties. "37 
2. Continued Scarcity of Strict Liability Rulings 
Another phenomenon in the pesticide drift case law over the last twenty-five 
years has been the continued scarcity of appellate judicial opinions addressing the 
question of whether or not Pesticide Driftmakers are liable under the theory of 
strict liability for hazardous activities to neighbors for crop, livestock or personal 
injuries.38 
In this regard, the Supreme Court of Washington•s 1977 opinion in Langan v. 
Valicopters, Inc. 39 constitutes the leading state appellate opinion decided during 
the last twenty-five years. The case breaks new ground by finding Pesticide 
Driftmakers strictly liable for off-site damages caused by agricultural chemical 
drift.40 In Langan, organic farmers sued an aerial applicator of pesticides for 
unintentionally spraying a pesticide known as thiodan on rows of vegetables 
fanned by plaintiffs. The defendant Valicopters was spraying an adjacent farm 
in Washington State in order to abate an infestation of Colorado beetles.41 The 
Langans• entire property was decertified by the Northwest Organic Food 
Producers• Association (NOFP A) because of the property's contamination by 
• 
pesticides sprayed by Valicopters. After a jury trial, a judgment of $5,500 in 
compensatory damages \Vas entered for the loss of plaintiffs entire vegetable crop. 
On certification to the Supreme Court of Washington, the court affirmed, 
concluding that the activity of applying pesticides was an "abnonnally dangerous 
activity" under section 519 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The court based 
its conclusion on a balancing of the following factors: (a) drift from pesticide 
spraying presented a high risk of harm; (b) the gravity of the harm which may 
result to an adjacent organic farmer from pesticide application was great; (c) the 
risk of pesticide harm to adjacent property owners could not be eliminated by the 
exercise of reasonable care; (d) aerial cropdusting was an activity which was not 
a matter of common usage in the area in question; (e) the application of pesticides 
adjacent to an organic farming area was conducted in an inappropriate place; and 
(f) that the value of cropdusting to the community, while significant, was not 
detenninative.42 In conclusion, the Supreme Court of Washington reasoned as follows: 
37. PESTICIDES AND TOXIC SUBSTANCES, supra note 1, at 336-37. 
38. See supra notes 18, 31-33 and accompanying text (pre-1970 strict liability decisions). 
39. 567 P.2d 218 (\Vash. 1977). 
40. See also Russell v. Windsor Props., Inc., 336 So. 2d 219 (La. Ct. App. 1978); Trotter v. Callens, 
546 P.2d 867 (N.M. a. App. 1976), cert. denied, 549 P.2d 285 (N.M. 1976). 
41. lAngan, 561 P.2d at 219. 
42. /d. at 222-23. Section 519 of the Restatement (Second) ofTorts provides that "[o]ne who carries 
on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for hann to the person, land or chattels of 
another resulting from the activity, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm." 
RESTA'I'EMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977). Section 520 lists six factors to be considered in 
determining whether an activity like application of pesticides is "abnonnally dangerous." These 
factors consist of the following: 
• 
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In the present case, the Langans were eliminated from the organic 
food .market for 1973 through no fault of their own. If cropdusting 
continues on the adjoining property, the Langans may never be able 
to sell their crops to organic food buyers. Appellants, on the other 
hand; will prttfit{rom the continued application of pesticides. Under 
these circums.tanc.es, there can be an equitable balancing of social 
interests only if appellants are made to pay for th,e consequences of 
their acts. 43 
While Langan was embraced enthusiastically by some commentators as an 
innovative harbinger of "a revitalized doctrine of hazardous activity strict 
liability"'" With far-reaching implicatiOnS for 11pfOmising neW applicatiOnS, "45 
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of 
another; 
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from .it will be great; 
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; 
• (d) extent to \Vhich the activity is not a matter of common usage; 
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and 
(t) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous 
attributes. 
/d.§ 520. 
43. Langan, 567 P.2d at 223. 
44. Virginia B. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The Rellitalization tJf Hazardous Activity Strict Liability, 
65 N.C. L. REV~ 257, 314 (1987). 
45. ld. at 257. Int<~restingly, Nolan nnd Ursin contend that the Supreme Court .of \Vashington's 
Tongan decision "stands at odds with the Restatement (Second)." I d. at 275. According_ to this analysis: 
[T]he [Langan] court applied strict liability to the activity of crop dusting when 
defendant's pesti·::ide had settled on a neighbor's organic farm. The court stated that it had 
previously "adopted the Restatement (Second) •.• , [that it had] considered e:~ch of the 
factors listed in the Restatement •.. , [and that] in this case, each test of the Restatement 
is met." This is a remarkable conclusion. The court, in its opinion, "[recognized] the 
prevalence of etop dusting and [acknowledged that] 287: aircraft were used in 1975." 
These acknowle·:lged facts cast doubts on the applicability of the last three Restatement 
(Second) facton. A careful analysis of the Langan court's treatment of these factors 
demonstrates that Langan, like the [Sup{eme Court of Washington's] earlier Siegler [v. 
Kuhlman] case, [502 P.2d 1181 (Wash. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 983 (1973) (finding 
strict liability for a gasoline explosion caused when defendant truckers gasoline trailer 
overturned)] sta.11ds for the proposition that the Restatement (Second) is not the proper 
focus for strict liability analysis. 
Regarding th~ requirement that an activity not occur as a matter of common usage, the 
Langan court first quoted the Restatement (Second) definition: "An activity is a matter 
of common usage if it is customarily carried on by the great mass of mankind, -or 'by 
many people in the community." The court then recited the above-quoted facts and simply 
characterized th~ presence of 287 aircraft as indicative that crop dusting was "canied on 
by only a comparatively small number of persons!' It thus concluded that crop dusting 
was "not a mttter of common usage.'• The court offered no more than this terse 
explanation, and it did not attempt to-explain why the operation of so mnny aircraft did 
not constitute c•lmmon -usage. When read in conjunction with the Siegler trucking case~ 
Langan suggests that common usage~ at least as that tern1 normally would be defined, 
does not defeat strict linbility. Similarly, the Langan court's treatment of the appropriate-
ness to the plao~ criterion suggest that this factor also has no place in contemporary strict 
1995] DAMAGES FROM CHEMICAL DRIFT 405 
and \Vas viewed as the functional beginning of a trend toward greater judicial 
acceptance of strict liability for cropdusters,46 in reality, Langan has not spurred 
a significant increase of strict liability holdings against Pesticide Driftmakers and 
has captured only lukewarm precedential interest in other courts.47 
liability analysis .. Although conceding tbat·crop dusting was prevalent and done in large 
portions of the Yakima Valley, the court's entire statement on the appropriateness of the 
place factor appears in one sentence: "Given the nature of organic farming, the use of 
pesticides adjacent to such an area must be considered an activity conducted in an 
inappropriate place... In effect, the court found strict liability despite the common sense 
intuition that crop dusting may be quite appropriate in a valley in which its use by farmers 
is prevalent. In tandem with the earlier application of strict liability to trucking on 
highv1,ays, the Lrutgan decision suggests that the Washington Supreme Court implicitly 
applies strict liability to hazardous activities that are appropriate to the place in which they 
occur. 
The I.angan court's treatment ofthe·final Restatement (Second) factor, which assesses 
an activity's value to the community, suggests that this factor also does not constitute a 
part of that court's strict liability analysis. Again, the court asserted that this factor \Vas 
met, but its analysis suggested not only that the coutt ignored this factor, but also that the 
loss spreading policy played a role in its decision~ 
. . 
• • • • 
The \Vashington Supreme Court's Siegler and Langan decisions illustrate a developing 
body of strict liability doctrine, which focuses on the ·hazardousness of an enterprise's. 
activity and the loss spreading policy. This case has developed independently of and more 
expansively than the Restatement. Although the Washington court p_urported to adhere to 
the Restatement (Second), other jurisdictions [including the Oregon crop dusting case of 
Loe -v. Lenhardt, 362 P.2d 312 (Or~ 1961)] have explicitly rejected the restrictions of the 
Restatement and Restatement (Second), together with theit underlying premises. 
/d. at 274-77 (footnotes omitted). 
46. \Villiam K. Jones, Strict Liabilityfor Hazardous Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1705, 1738:..39 
(1992). 
47. Since 1977, five out-of-court jurisdictions have cited Langan. In most cases, the citing cases 
did not follow the holding in Langan imposing strict liability on aerial application of cropdusting as an 
''abnonnally dangerous activityt• under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§§ 519-520 (1977). 
Indiana Harbor Belt Co. v. American Cyanamid Co. involved a railroad yard's action against a shipper 
for cleanup costs from a chemical spill, in Which the trial court judge held that shipping acrylonitrite 
through an area adjoining a residential area of Chicago was an abnonnally dangerous activity for which 
the shipper was strlctly liable .. Langan was cited in support of the proposition that "it is fairer to place 
the burden of the loss on the person who cr,eated the inordinate risk than on someone who has no relation 
to the activity other than an injury from it." Indiana Harbor Belt Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 662 
F. Supp~ 635, 639 (N.D. Ill. 1981),appeal dismissed, 860 F.2d 1441 (7th Cir. 1988), rev'd& remanded, 
916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.) (criticizing the lower court's analysis and finding no strict 
liability based, in part, on the common activity of shipping chemicals through the Chicago railyards). 
In SKF Farms v. Superior Court (Hummingbird Inc.), a cropdusting case, the intermediate appellate 
court noted that "no California court has ever squarely addressed the issue of whether cropdusting is 
abnormally dangerous and therefore_ subject to strict liability .. " SKF Farms v. Superior Court 
(Hummingbird Inc.), 200 Cal. Rptr. 497, 499 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). Langan vtas cited as one of only a 
handful of "agricultural jurisdictions" that have confronted the issue and held cropdusting to be 
ultrahazardous. /d. The intennediate appellate court held that -·it was error [for the trial court] to sustain 
the demurrer to Petitioner's strict liability causes_ of action" v1hen the trial court considered "only one _of 
the six factors" addressed in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. /d. 
The court in Bloxsont v. San Luis Valley Crop Care, Inc. applied principles of res ipsa loquitur. 
lAngan was cited in juxtaposition with the proposition that "[b ]ecause of our disposition of this case, we 
• 
• 
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Besides Langan, frCJm 1970 to the present, only a smattering of other appellate 
opinions have addresst~d the issue of liability of agricultural Pesticide Driftmakers 
under a theory of stri•:t liability for hazardous activities. In the 1979 case, J.L._ 
Wilson Farms, Inc. v. Wallace; the Arkansas intennediate appellate court held that 
the aerial application of the herbicide 2,4-D on rice fields in the vicinity of 
plaintiffs cotton crops .. necessarily involved a risk of serious harm to broad leaf 
crops of others regardless of the degree of care which is exercised in its use ... 48 
Therefore, strict liability against the owner and applicator was appropriate. SKF 
Farms v .. Superior Court (Hummingbird' lnc.)49 involved an action by California 
lettuce growers against adjoining wheat and grain farmers. The plaintiffs 
contended that the latter were strictly liable when the herbicide 2,4-D drifted onto 
the lettuce growers' fields, causing severe crop damage. In reviewing the trial 
court's grant of a demurrer, which ruled as a matter of law that cropdusting is not 
an ultrahazardous activity subject to strict liability, the appellate court noted that 
"although several early decisions from California ... have discussed liability for 
cropdusting in terms of negligence or nuisance . . • no California court has ever 
squarely addressed the issue of whether cropdusting is abnorn1ally dangerous and 
therefore subject to strict liability."50 The SKF Farms court noted a few out-of-
jurisdiction appellate decisions and law review articles in support of strict liability 
for cropdusting, and '::anvassed the provisions of section 520 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, but concluded that "by its very nature, the issue of whether an 
activity is ultrahazardous cannot be decided on demurrer."51 
need not reach the contention .•• that San Luis should be held responsible for the destruction of 
Bloxsom's alfalfa crop on principles of strict liability." Bloxsom v. San Luis Valley Crop Care, lnc.t 596 
P.2d 1189, 1191 n.3 (Colo. 1979). 
In Ligocky v. Wilcox, the Court of Appeals of New Mexico held that strict liability in tort did not 
apply to an individual who aerially applied 'herbicide to the owner's milo field to kill weeds where the 
owner supplied the herbicitle to the applicator. Langan was cited by a dissenting judge in support of his 
view that strict liability for cropdusting was suggested by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§§ 519-
520 (1977). Ligocky v. \Vilcox, 620 P.2d 1300, 1303 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980). 
In Erbrich Prods. Co., Inc. v. Wills, the appellate court found strict liability under RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS§§ 519,520 (l977) to be inapplicable because the activity -of using chlorine gas in 
a manufacturing plant could be undertaken safely. Langan \vas cited for the proposition that the issue 
of strict liability should be decided by the court). Erbrich Prods. Co., Inc. v. \Vilis, 509 N.'E.2d 850. 857 
(Ind. a. App. 1987). 
Therefore, while the St preme Court of Washington may view its decision in Langan as nn example 
of its broad-based approach "in adopting new remedies and expanding tort_ liability, •• in general, \Vymnn 
v. \Vallace, 588 P~2d 1133. 1134 (Wash. 1979), other American courts have been much less venturesome 
in attempting to expand tc;rt liability to encompass strict liability for application of pesticides. Indeed, 
the Supreme Court of w~ hington itself seems to be retrenching a bit in its strict liability analysis under 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519, 520 (1977). See, e.g., Nevi Meadows Holding Co. v. 
\Vashington \Vater Power Co., _687 P.2d 212, 215-17 (Wash. 1984) (affinning the holding of the 
intennediate appellate--court that the transmission of natural gas through underground lines is not nn 
"abnormally dangerous activity" giving rise to strict liability). 
48. 590 S.W.2d 42, 45 (Ark. Ct. App. 1979). 
49. 200 Cal. Rptr. -497 (Cal. Ct .. App. 1984). 
50. Id. at 498 (citatic•n omitted). 
51. /d. at 499. 
• 
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In deciding the 1977 case, Bella v. Aurora Air, lnc.,52 the Supreme Court of 
Oregon reversed a judgment non obstante veredicto that "set aside a jury verdict 
for damage done to their mint crop by a herbicide which defendant Aurora was 
engaged to spray by airplane on the wheat field of [a] neighbor.''53 In a 
thoughtful opinion written by Justice Linde, the court cited its decision in Loe v. 
Lenhardt for the precedent that strict liability is a viable cause of action against 
Pesticide Driftmakers.54 The Bella court brushed aside a pre-suit statutory filing 
requirement, and reaffirtned its earlier decision imposing strict liability against 
landowners for pesticide drift caused by a contractor's spraying, stating that "even 
when the risk only moderately threatens economic activities rather than harm to 
life, health, or property or environment . . . the activity may nevertheless be 
•abnortnally dangerous• if it can be carried on only with a substantiaiiy uncontrol-
lable likelihood that the damage will sometime occur ... 55 Moreover, in a 1988 
Oregon intermediate appellate court opinion, Speer & Sons Nursery, Inc. v. 
Duyck, 56 the court reversed a trial court's dismissal of a complaint for failure to 
state a cause of action in a case involving the ground spraying by tractor of a 
herbicide on a nursery where an adjoining oat and wheat farm-er claimed crop 
damage from pesticide drift The Speer court observed that .. [w]hether ground-
based chemical spraying is an abnomtally dangerous activity Iwas] an issue_ of 
first impression" in Oregon.57 Drawing upon prior Oregon pesticide drift case 
la\v, the intermediate appellate court remanded the legal deterntination of whether 
or not ground spraying of pesticides was abnor1nally dangerous, and therefore 
subject to strict liability, to the trial court, noting: 
Two types of infomtation, legal and factual; are relevant to the 
resolution of that question. However, inforination from neither source 
is sufficient at this stage of the proceeding to provide_ an answer. 
The legal information is found in statutes and regulations, which 
reflect policy and value judgments regarding an activity. A court, trial 
or appellate, may look to such enactments in determining whether or 
not an activity is abnonnally dangerous. Here, we have no legal 
[statutory or regulatory] sources to guide us. 
The second source of infonnation is the facts relating to the activity 
[and whether or not the .. factual setting .. is .. extra hazardous .. ].58 
During the last twenty-five years there have also been a few decisions declining 
to impose strict liability on Pesticide Driftmakers and requiring proof of negligence. 
Perhaps the most significant recent case declining to impose strict liability in this 
52. 566 P.2d 4&9 (Or. 1977). 
53. ltL at 490. 
54. /d. at 493 (citing Loe v. Lenhardt, 362 P.2d 312 (Or. 1961)). 
55. /d. at 495. 
56. 759 P .. 2d 1133 (Or~ Q. App. 1988). 
57. /d. at 1134 (emphasis added). 
58. Id. (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted) .. 
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context is the Supretne Court of Wisconsin's 1984 decision in Bennet v._ Larsen Co. 59 
In Bennet, beekeepers brought a multi-count action for damages for death of their 
honeybees allegedly caused by the application of the pesticide Sevin on neighboring 
cornfields by the defendant lessee. Looking to the six factors contained in section 
520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a unanimous court quoted a comment to 
the Restatement (Second) that provides as follows: .. The essential question is whether 
the risk created is so unusual, either because of its magnitude or because of the 
circumstances surrounding it, as to justify the imposition of strict liability for the 
harm that results from it, even though it is carried on with all reasonable care. "60 
In a marked departure from the Supreme Court of Washington's approach in 
Langan,61 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Bennet held "that pesticide application 
is not an ultrahazardc.us activity warranting the application of strict liability for 
' 
resulting harm"62 base<l on the following analysis: 
As indicated on the pesticide labels, pesticides can be highly toxic to 
honeybees and can cause a significant degree of hann through direct bee 
kills and subsequent depletion of hive populations when contaminated 
pollen is ingeste.d by the hive bees~ Although pesticide spraying may 
produce some risk of harm to honeybees on the property and to bees in 
hives located off the property from drift or overspraying, that risk can be 
reduced through the exercise of reasonable care in spraying" Precaution~ 
. . ' 
ary measures to minimize bee kills on the property and to reduce the risk 
of drift or overspray include monitoring wind speed and direction, 
temperature and humidity conditions, and. spraying at times bees are less 
likely to forage. An experienced applicator testified that spraying could 
be accurate to within one or two feet on the target field. Further, 
pesticide harm can be reduced by carefully following label directions, 
which are designed to reduce the risk of harm with proper application 
and use. 
Testimony at trial showed that pesticide application to control severe 
pest infestation is a common. activity ·which is necessary to ensure 
healthy crop growth. Testimony revealed that several canning companies 
in the .. • . area each year sprayed pesticides on their com in order to 
avoid the potential complete destruction of their crops by com borers and 
earwonns. We c~onclude that the application of pesticides is a necessary 
and beneficial activity to ensure the production of adequate and healthy 
food and that its value to the people of the state outweighs the potential 
for harm.63 
-59. 348 N.W.2d 540 (Wis., 1984).-
60. /d. _at 553 (quoting RES'I'l\TEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS cmt. f (1977)). 
61. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text. 
62. Bennet, 348 N.W 2d at 553. 
63. /d. Similarly,_ the Texas intennediate appellate court in Sun Pipe Line Co. v. ·Kirkpatrick, 514 
S.W.2d 789, 791-94 (Te:t. Ct. App. 1974), also chose not to impose strict liability on Pesticide 
Driftmakers. A lando\vner brought an action against _an oil pipeline and_ its herbicide applicator for 
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3. Continued Judicial Rulings Resting on Expansive Conceptions of.Negligence 
Law 
During the last quarter century, the pattern of pre-1970 cases remained intact: 
"[t]he vast majority of actions brought against [pesticide] applicators and their 
employees [\vere] _grounded in negligence ... 64 Moreover, the courts continued to 
.. almost invariably impose a high degree of care upon the applicator"6$ in analyzing 
the relevant duty of care. This "broad conception of negligence"66 is illustrated by 
the 1973 opinion of the Supreme Court of Kansas in Binder v~ Perkins.67 Farmers 
who leased an alfalfa field obtained a judgment against the operator of an aerial 
cropdusting fmn who had applied 2,4-D herbicide to a neighboring wheat field under 
contract \Vith the wheat farmer. In affirming the trial court decision,_ the Binder court 
endorsed 11[t]he duty of care imposed upon [a] crop sprayeru as predicated on "a 
dangerous instrumentality, [the] handling of [which is] a hazardous activity and [that] 
the one handling [the pesticide has] a duty to prevent its escape. 1168 The Binder court 
observed that its rationale encompassed "the outline of a high degree of care . . . . 
It is no more than an application of the standard that . . . '[ w ]hat are reasonable 
precautions vary with the character of the business .. ~ . A peculiar hazard calls for 
increased care; and the greater the risk, the more imperative the obligation•. "69 Since 
1970, liability on a negligence theory has been imposed for the applicator's failure 
to prevent pesticide drift from damaging neighboring lettuce crops,70 for damages 
,· 
damages to growing timber and to fences. Sun Pipe Line owned an easement approximately thirty feet 
in width across the northern boundary of plaintiffs property. Sun hired the herbicide applicator to spray 
overhanging tree limbs on plaintiffs property which prevented Sun from using airplanes to patrol and 
inspect the pipeline for leaks. Plaintiff landowner testified that .,a large number of his trees were killed; 
others, weakened by the spray, became infested with beetles and died; [moreover] ••. trees which were 
killed fell across his fences causing further damage." ld~ at 790. \Vhile technically not a "drift" case·-
since Sun sprayed bis own pro_perty interest, which happened to be across plaintiffs fee interest the 
case is interesting because of the court's reliance on ·prior analogous Texas crop dusting precedent in drift 
cases as the rationale for rejecting strict liability theories and requiting the plaintiff to prove negligence. 
See id. at 791-94. 
64. Kennedy, supra note 17, at 78 (footnote omitted). 
65. /d. 
66. Jones, supra note 47, at 1739. 
67. 516 P.2d 1012 (Kan. 1973). 
68. /d. at 1016. 
69. ld~ (citations omitted) .. A similar conception of a very high standard of care in pesticide 
application cases. was articulated by the Supreme Court of Alabama in Boroughs v. Joiner, 337 So. 2d 
340, 343 (Ala. 1976). The Alabama Supreme Court noted that negligent liability for a landowner 
contracting with a pesticide applicator is: 
not absolute but is imposed on the landowner for his failure to exercise due care in a 
situation in which the work being perfonned is sufficiently dangerous that the landowner 
himself has a duty to third persons who may sustain injury or, damage from the work 
unless proper precautions are taken in the perfonnance thereof. 
/d.; see also Ligocky v. \Vilcox, 620 P.2d 1300, 1302 (N.M. 1980) ("As the danger that should 
reasonably be foreseen increases, so the amount of care required also increases."). 
70. Farm-Aero Serv., Inc. v. Henning Produce, Inc., 532 P.2d 181 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975). 
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to adjacent tomatoes, squash and Irish potatoes,71 for overspray of a rice field 
resulting in circumstantial evidence of damages to a neighboring cotton field,72 for 
drift damage to caladium plants from spray of neighboring ditches and canals,'3 for 
alfalfa crop injuries due to a shift in the wind,74 for drift from timber spraying 
activities onto a cotton field,75 for drift onto a redclover crop during wann weather 
conditions/6 for damage to soybeans occasioned by a cropduster spraying over 
adjacent fannland,77 for death and injury to cows which became severely ill two 
days after a cropduster sprayed a nelghbor's field with Thimet, used for· rootwonn 
control,78 and for the killing, and contamination of numerous catfish at a commercial 
catfish farm by neighboring application of pesticides to cotton and soybean fields.79 
In the proof of pe:)ticide drift cases, judicial decisions predicated on negligence 
concepts have recently "wander[ed] close to the domain of strict liability .. 80 through 
invocation of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and use of statutory and regulatory 
violations to establish negligence per se. For example, in both the 1979 Colorado 
Supreme Court opinion in Bloxsom v. San Luis Valley Crop Care, Inc.,81 and the 
1980 Georgia interrnediate appellate court opinion in DeVane v. Smith,82 the 
judiciary used res iJJsa loquitur to forn1 a presumption of negligence where the 
respective crops of the plaintiffs suddenly withered and died.83 Negligence per se, 
as in other areas of negligence law, is readily established in pesticide drift cases by 
showing "a violation of registration, labeling, or other ,provisions of the law!"84 The 
71. Sullivan v. Voylt!s, 462 S .. W .. 2d 454 (Ark. 1971). 
72. Hamlin Flying S~rv., Inc. v. Breckinridge, 628 S.W.2d 312 (Ark. 1982). 
· 73. Mulford Hickers•)n Corp. v. Asgrow-Kilgore Co., 282 So. 2d 19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973). 
74. Binder v. Perkim;, 516 P.2d 1012 (Kan.1973). 
75. Mid-Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Whitehead, 357 So. 2d 122 (Miss. 1978). 
76 .. \Vatkins v. Johnf;on, 606 S.W.2d 493 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). 
77. Red River Spray Serv., Inc., v. Nelson, 404 N.\V.2d 332 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). 
78. Mustion v. Ealy, 266 N.\V.2d 730 (Neb. 1978). 
79 .. D&W Jones, Inc. v. Collier, 372 So. 2d 288 (Miss. 1979). The court applied nn expansive joint 
liability theory for the defendants' negligence. The Mississippi Supreme Court held that where the 
defendants fanners and < ropdusters knew or reasonably should have known of the catfish-producing 
operations of the neighbc,ring plaintiff corporation, and the toxic effect of agricultural poisons on fish 
and of the fact that other defendants v1ere making similar application of pesticides in the area, the 
defendants' collective actions constituted an implied concert of action which subjected them to potential 
joint and several liability for the alleged single, indivisible injury to plaintiffs catfish-producing 
operations. /d. at 294. 
80. PESTICIDES AND TOXIC SUBSTANCES, supra note l, at 341. 
81. 596 P .2d 1189 (Colo. 1979). 
82. 268 S.E.2d 711 (Ga. a. ,App. 1980). 
83. /d. at 713 .. Comr•are analogous pesticide cases applying res ipsa /Qquiiurto situations of product 
mixup by manufacturers or applicators leading to crop damage being suffered by the lnndowner. See 
Eaeton Fruit Co. v. California Spray-Chem .. Corp., 445 P.2d 437 (Ariz. 1968); Burrv. Sherwin-Williams 
Co., 268 P.2d 1041 (Cal. 1954) (product mixup); Thomas Helicopters, Inc. v. San Tan Ranches, 633 P.2d 
1145 (Idaho 1981) (pestidde applicator hired to spray insecticide on sugar beet crop sprayed a herbicide 
by mistake). 
84. PESTICIDES AND TOXIC SUBSTANCES, supra note I, at 342. See aLftJ Kennedy, ~fupra note 17, 
at 90-94:. 
• 
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Wisconsin Supreme Court's 1984 opinion in Bennett v. Larsen85 is an excellent 
recent example of judicial use of negligence per se principles in a pesticide drift 
context. In Bennett, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants had violated the 
Wisconsin Economic Poisons Act, which prohibited the u[u]se [of] any pesticide in 
a manner inconsistent with its labeling. 1186 The court concluded that the state 
pesticide statute was intended by the Wisconsin legislature to protect people, plants 
and animals from injuries from economic poisons in a manner more protective than 
that afforded by the common Iaw.frl Accordingly, the Bennett court held that the 
statute created a duty of due care for pesticide users to follow directions on pesticide 
labels in applying pesticides; failure to carry out that duty \Vas negligence per se.88 
4 .. Emergence ,of ''Toxic Tort'' Theories of Recovery for Personal Injuries From 
Exposure to Pesticides 
The recent emergence of the generic field. of "toxic torts"89 presents the potential 
that Pesticide Driftmakers may be held liable for wrongfully exposing humans to low 
levels of pesticides which ultimately cause personal injuries, diseases, or death. Tort 
recovery for personal injuries occasioned by exposure to pesticides has been 
theoretically possible for several years under the analytical rubric of "drenching 
cases.~~ "Drenching cases have been brought against [pesticide] applicators ,as \Veil 
as manufacturers and sellers.. in situations "in which an individual suffers serious 
injucy after exposure to a large amount of pesticides in a very short period of time 
and in a manner not intended by the manufacturer ... 90 The 1961 Mississippi case of 
Lawler v. Skelton91 is a prototypical "drenching case.'' As explained by other 
commentators: 
In Lawler, the plaintiff presented substantial evidence that defendant's 
contractor; who \Vas spraying a cotton crop with a mixture of malathion 
and endrin, oversprayed and released the pesticides over the cotton gin 
where plaintiff was working. It was undisputed that if a person receives 
an excessive amount of those chemicals, they can be highly toxic and 
dangerous to human life; the container labels, as well as a government 
85. 348 N.\V.2d 540 (Wis. 1984). 
86. ld. at 548 (quoting WIS. STAT~ § 94.71 (1975)). 
87. /d. 
88. Bennett, 348 N.\V.2d at 549; cf. J.L. Wilson Fanns, Inc. v~ \Vallace, 590 S.W.2d 42,. 44 {Ark. 
Ct. App. 1979) (upholding admission of evidence- that defendants failed to comply with regulation 
requiring state authorization of commercial aerial application of pesticides and notice of spraying). 
89. See generally G.\V. BOSTON & M. STUART MADDEN, LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND TOXIC 
TORTS: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS (1994) {the first casebook devoted exclusively to toxic torts); 
Robert F. Blomquist, American Toxic Tort Law: An, Historical Background, 1979-87, PACE ENVTL. L. 
REV. 8S (1992) (collecting cases and conceptually tracing the early history of American toxic tort law 
up to the middle part of the 1980s); Robert F. Blomquist, Emerging Themes and Dilemmas in American 
Toxic Tort Law 1988~91: A Legal-Historical and Philosophical Exegesis, 18 S. ILL. L.J.l (1993): Robert 
F. Blomquist, An Introduction to American Toxic Tort Law: -Three Overarching Metaphors and Three 
Sources of Law, 26 VAL. U~L. REV. 795 (1992). 
90. Brett & Potter, supra note 20, at 403. 
91. 130 So. 2d 565 (Miss. 1961). 
• 
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aeronautics safety manual, reflected that endrin and malathion are 
dangerous to humans exposed by skin contact, inhalation or swallowing. 
Immediately after the spraying, the plaintiff became dizzy and nauseated, 
the next day his temperature rose and he went into a coma. In subse-
quent months he suffered various illnesses. 
The court determined that the great weight of the evidence supported 
the conclusion that the contractor sprayed the plaintiff with a chemical 
mixture and that the spraying was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs 
immediate acute i1Iness.92 
When a victim suffers acute symptoms shortly after intensive exposure to a toxic 
pesticide, .. courts have [found] little hesitation in finding liability on the part of the 
applicator or other responsible party who could have prevented the heavy expo-
sure."93 
In contradistinction, low level personal injury exposure cases, \Vhile theoretically 
available against Pesticide Drifunakers,94 are extremely difficult to prove. This 
difficulty of proof stems from practical problems encountered by toxic tort plaintiffs 
in detecting injury at the time of exposure to pesticide drift and in linking clinical 
symptoms to exposure.95 Absent judicial or legislative relaxation of proof standards 
in the future, it is unlikely that many plaintiffs will be able to establish tort liability 
against Pesticide Driftmakers for chronic personal injuries from low level exposure 
to pesticides.96 
Ill. Some Tentative Thoughts Toward Reconceptualizing Liability for Pesticide 
Driftmakers 
A. Synthesis of the F'reexisting Liability Paradigm 
The preexisting liability paradigm for Pesticide Drifunakers is at war with itself, 
causing considerable uncertainties and transaction costs, without providing sufficient 
incentives to prevent unnecessary pesticide use by fanners. On the one hand, a line 
of cases assumes that pesticides can be applied safely and without cross-boundary 
spillover effects to neighbors' crops, livestock and persons. On the other hand, a 
92. Brett & Potter, supra note 20, at 403 ... 04 (footnote omitted); see also Holluday v. Chicago. 
Burlington & Quincy R. Co., 255 F. Supp. 879, 885-86 (S.D. Iowa 1966) (concluding plaintifrs disease 
was caused by heavy exposure to pesticides); Tripp v. Choate, 415 S.\V.2d 808, 811-12 (Mo. 1967) 
(concluding decedent's acute exposure to DDT, as a result of defendant's neglig_ence, caused decedent's 
death). 
93. Brett & Potter, supra note 1.8, at 405 (footnote omitted). "These cases like the [Pesticide 
Driftmakers] property dmnage cases, seem to infer causation from the facts of misapplication and damage 
similar to that usually as!;ociated with exposure to the product and· assume v1rongdoing when exposure, 
causation, and injury are well established." /d. (footnote omitted). 
94. For various toxk: personal injury theories of liability, see generally BOSTON & MADDEN, supra 
note 89. 
95. Brett & Potter, supra note 18, at 409-21 (discussing practical proof issues in pesticide exposure 
cases). 
96. /d. 
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different set of cases presupposes that pesticide drift from application of agricultural 
poisons cannot be safely applied, despite the exercise of due care, because, of 
uncontrollable factors such as wind gusts, weather changes, and the physical 
characteristics of pesticide droplets or aerosols. 
Further uncertainties attend pesticide drift liability rules due to ambiguities in the 
language and interpretation of the abnortnally dangerous activity provisions of 
sections 519 and 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. In addition, the judiciary 
has used expansive, but vague, negligence principles in fonnulating the duty of care 
for Pesticide Driftmakers. There are also emerging differences in the \Villingness of 
courts to find causation. In crop or livestock damage cases causation is freely 
inferred. However, courts have been hesitant to find causation in recent pesticide 
exposure toxic tort actions involving personal injury. Moreover, state liability regimes 
addressing damages caused by Pesticide Driftmakers are clouded by an interlocking 
set of federal regulatory rules, practices and programs which serve to directly 
encourage unsustainable agricultural pesticide use, while indirectly discouraging 
alternative agricultural practices which seek to minimize pesticide usage.97 
B. An Outline of a Proposal for Reconceptualizing Liability 
(1) In a comprehensive and insightful 1989 report, entitled Alternative Agricul-
ture,98 the National Research Council made a number of conclusions about the 
97. As pointed out in a recent government report: 
A wide mnge of federal policies, including commodity programs, trade policy, research 
and extension programs, food grading and cosmetic standards, pesticide regulation, water 
quality and supply policies, and tax policy, significantly influence farmers' choices of 
agricultural practices. As a whole, federal policies work against environmentally benign 
practices and the adoption of alternative agricultural systems, particularly those involving 
crop rotations, certain soil conservation practices, reductions in pesticide use, and 
increased use of biological and cultural means of pest control. These policies have 
generally made a plentiful food supply a higher priority than protection of the resource 
base. 
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURE 6 (1989) [hereinafter ALTERNATIVE 
AGRICULTURE]. 
98. /d. The background for the National Research Council's report is set forth in the preface to the 
book as foJlows: 
The 1980s have been a time of change in U.S. agriculture. The financial viability of many 
farms and rural communities declined during the mid-1980s as crop prices and land values 
fell. More than 200,000 farms went bankrupt. Since 1986, increasing market prices and 
exports of major farm commodities have improved the farm economy, but this recovecy 
would not have been possible without record levels of government support. 
The environmental consequences of fanning have also become increasingly important 
to policymakers, fanners, and the public. The Environmental Protection Agency has 
identified agriculture as the largest nonpoint source of water pollution. Pesticides and 
nitrates from fertilizers and manures have been found in the groundwater of most states. 
The issue of pesticide and antibiotic residues in food remains unsolved. Soil erosion, 
salinization, and depletion of aquifers for irrigation are significant problems in some 
• regions. 
In 1984, the Board on Agriculture appointed a committee to study the science and 
policies that have influenced the adoption of alternative production systems designed to 
• 
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current profligate u:;e of pesticides in American agriculture.99 The Council also 
issued several recommendations regarding n-eeded .. changes in commodity and 
[federal] regulatory J?Olicies [needed] to neutralize their bias against the adoption of 
alternative fanning systems. utOO 
(2) Changes in federal farm and environmental policy,101 research and develop-
ment strategy, 102 and agricultural economics and market infonnation dissemination 
control these problems. The committee found that many fanners have taken steps to 
reduce the costs and adverse environmental effects of their operations. Some have 
improved conventional techniques, and others have adopted alternatives. 
• • • • 
For the rest of this century, agricultural producers and policymakers will focus on three 
goals: (1) keeping U.S. farm exports competitive; (2) .cutting production costs; and (3) 
reducing the environmental consequences of farming. The committee's report examines 
the scientific and economic viability of alternative systems that can help farmers and 
policymakers achieve these goals. 
Id. a:t v-vi. 
99. Exam,ples ofscame oftbe conclusions about national agricultural pesticide use in the Nntio.nal 
Research Council's repott are as follows: 
Many federal pc•licies discourage adoption of alternative practices and systems by 
economically penalizing those who adopt rotations, apply certain soil conservation 
systems, or attempt to reduce pesticide applications. Federal programs often tolerate and 
sometimes encourage unrealistically high yield goals, inefficient fertilizer and pesticide 
use, and unsustainable use of land and water. Many fanners in these programs manage 
their farms to maximize present and future program benefits, sometimes at the expense 
of environmental quality .. 
• • • • 
... Fertilizers and pesticides are often applied at rates that cannot be justified 
economically without consideration of present or future fann program payments. 
• • • • 
. . • Pederal grading standards, or standards adopted under federal marketing. orders, 
. . 
often discourage alternative pest control practices for fruits and vegetables by imposing 
cosmetic and insect-part criteria that have little if any relation to nutritional quality~ 
•• • •• 
. . . Current federal pesticide regulatory policy applies a stricter standard to new 
pesticides and pest control technologies than to cunently used older pesticides approved 
before 1972. This policy exists in spite of the fact that a small number of cunently used 
pesticides appear.; to present the vast majority of health and environmentnl risks associated 
with pesticides. This policy inhibits the marketing of biologically based or genetically 
engineered products and safer pesticides that may enhance opportunities for alternative 
agricultural prod1Jction systems. 
Jd. at 10, 12-13 (emphasis omitted). 
100. /d. at 17. 
• 
Federal commod1ty programs must be restructured to help frumers realize the full benefits 
of the productiv~ty gains possible through many alternative practices. These practices 
include wider adoption of rotations. v1ith legumes and nonleguminous crops, the ,continued 
use of improved cultivars, IPM and biological pest -control, disease-resistant livestock, 
improved fann nmchinery, lower-cost management strategies that use fewer off-farm and 
synthetic chenlic~ inputs~ and. a host of alternative technologies and management systems. 
/d. (emphasis omitted). 
101. ld. at 17-20. 
102. /d. at 20-22 . 
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practices103 to provide incentives for farmers to adopt more environmentally benign 
agricultural practices are necessacy, but not sufficient, to more efficiently and 
effectively prevent future crop, livestock and personal injuries from pesticide drift, 
while lowering transaction costs due to uncertainties in the liability regime" 
(3) A fundamental shift from the current drift-control liability scheme of ambigu-
ous state tort principles to a future drift-prevention approach (with theoretically lower 
transaction costs) requires the. legislative reinvention of pesticide drift liability rules 
at the state level. In this regard,. four key transitional legislative rule changes would 
be advisable.. First; by preparation and implementation of a state-approved .. best 
agricultural practices" plan including integrated pest management (IPM) measures, 
crop rotations, and genetic improvement of crops to resist pests and diseases and to 
use nutrients-more effectively. Compliance with the plan would immunize farmers_ 
and certified pesticide applicators whom they hired from pesticide drift tort suits for 
crop and livestock damage to neighbors.1Gi Second, a "Drift Compensation Fund" 
103. ld. at 22-23. 
104. Compare the EPA's recently initiated Pesticide Environmental Stewardship Program (PESP),. 
As described in a recent EPA publication: 
EPA ha.S launched its first pesticide voluntary partnership for pollution prevention. The 
Pesticide Environmental Stewardship Program (PESP), is dedicated to protecting human 
health and preserving the environment by reducing both the use of pesticides and the risks 
associated with pesticide use. The partnership is a key element in the PESP, which is 
sponsored by EPA, USDA, and FDA. Current partners ..• include agricultural growers 
as well as non .. agricultural interests, such as utility companies who use pesticides on their 
rigbt-of-v1ays. 
Partners in PESP agree to develop and implement an environmental stewardship plan 
tailored to their own_ pesticide usage. They also agree to use the safest, most effective pest 
management practices available. 
In turn, EPA provides a liaison to assist the partner in developing comprehensive, 
achievable goals. Liaisons also act as "customer service representatives .. for EPA, 
providing the partner with access to information and personnel. EPA also promises to 
integrate the partners' stewardship plans into its agricultural policies and programs. EPA 
has also provided some grant dollars to some of the charter partners. 
So far, grower groups have committed to a number of projects, including conducting 
more research into IPM techniques, developing computer prediction models for more 
precise pesticide applications, educating their members and the public regarding pesticide 
use, and working with equipment manufacturers to fine-tune application -techniques. 
Examples include: 
~ The American Com Growers will be promoting and expanding its "bottom-
line" com growing contest, which seeks to maximize a grower's profit from com 
production while reducing production in puts such as pesticides. 
~ The California Pear Growers and California Pear Advisory Board are fund-
ing through grower and processor check-offs - the Pear Pest Management 
Research Fund and research into s~fer pest management techniques. 
,. The California Citrus Board has coirunitted $750,000 to research into safer 
pest control. 
,. A consortium of East Coast and Midwest utilities is training their pesticide 
users in techniques to lower risks from pesticide application. 
PESP was announced in December 1994 and grows out of the commitment made by EPA, 
USDA and FDA in joint testimony before Congress in September 19·93 to develop 
commodity .. specific initiatives to reduce the use and risks of pesticides. 
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should be establishc!d and administered within the state department of agriculture. 
Reasonable application fees from farmers submitting .. best agricultural practices" 
plans, pesticide applicator license fees, and a sliding scale agricultural pesticides sales 
tax and use tax varying in percentage based on the_ relative hazardousness of the 
pesticide would finance the "Drift Compensation Fund."105 The administrator of 
the Drift Compensation Fund would be authorized to pay economic damages up 
to a possible cap level of several thousand dollars · for crop and livestock damage 
supported. by substantial credible administrative evidence and linked to pesticide drift 
from a farmer with an approved "best agricultural practices" plan in place at the time 
of the occurrence of the alleged drift damages. Third, tort suits against farmers 
without approved ilbest agricultural practices" plans at the time of neighbors' drift-
induced crop or livestock damage claims, and against agricultural pesticide 
applicators, would be subject to liability in the courts as detennined by preexisting 
state tort liability rules. Fourth, "toxic tort" suits against Pesticide Driftmakers 
seeking to recover for _personal injuries for physical exposure to pesticides would be 
determined by the courts pursuant to preexisting tort liability rules. Too much 
uncertainty exists at the present time regarding the extent and total amount of 
potential toxic tort Hnits from pesticide exposure to establish a no-fault administrative 
mechanism similar to the one proposed for crop and livestock damages. 
Conclusion 
Throughout this century, liability for agricultural Pesticide Driftmakers has been 
governed by an an1algamation of ambiguous and confusing tort principles. As we 
approach the next century, federal regulatory changes which would seek to provide 
incentives for alternative agriculture, coupled with state legislative liability and 
compensation innovations to encourage fanners to minimize pesticide usage, would 
help to clarify the law governing Pesticide Driftmakers. Moreover, this administrative 
approach would tend to lower transaction costs for resolving disputes involving crop 
and livestock dam~1ges from pesticide drift. 
U.S~ ENVTI... PRO'TECf'lON AGENCY, POLLtmON PREVENTION NEWS 3 (1995). 
1 OS.. The idea of a tax on hazardous pesticide sales stems from Alan Newman, Ranking Pe.dicides 
By Environmental Impact, 29 ENvn.~ SCI. & TECH. 324A, 325A (1995). 
[William Pease of the School of Public Health at the University of California-Berkeley] 
and his collaborators have proposed a California pesticide tax to fund state programs for 
environmental protection and integrated pest management which~ for example, could be 
tied to a hazard ranking system. In practice, lhis pesticide tax \Vould mirror cunent federal 
taxes on chlorofluorocarbon alternatives that make environmentally safer 
chlorofluorocal'bon alternatives more .economically attractive. However, such a pesticide 
tax would require some scientific consensus on the appropriate model, which doesn't nov1 
• ext st. 
Id. at 325A. 
